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Non-attack flows are affected by attack traffic in 
non-resilient systems [1].
When flow monitoring systems are not resilient 
against anomalies, the following consequences 
may need to be faced:
Exporter:
• Packet loss
• Early-expired flow records
• Full flow cache, unaccounted packets and 
flows
• Overall system overload
Collector:
• Packet loss
• Incomplete and/or incorrect results from 
periodic processes
Due to the design of current flow monitoring 
technologies, flow-based IDSs are subject to the 
following problems:
• Data is available after delays, caused by 
record expiration, processing  and storage
• Monitoring equipment potentially becomes 
overloaded due to anomalies, affecting the data
2. Problems of flow-based IDSs 3. Consequences
Flow monitoring technologies (e.g. NetFlow and IPFIX) provide an aggregated view of network activity:
Advantages: Scalable for use in high-speed networks and widely deployed in routers, switches and 
probes.
Procedure:
1. Exporter aggregates packets into flow records
2. Collector stores flow records
3. Analysis application analyzes flow data
1. Why flow-based?
Destination IPSource IP Destination PortSource Port Protocol IP ToS Input Interface Packets Bytes
Flow Collector
Analysis 
application
Flow Exporter NetFlow / IPFIX
Intrusion Detection
System (IDS)
Extend architecture:
1. Move intrusion detection partly to Exporter
and share detections with Collector
2. Collector and Analysis application 
share detected intrusions with Exporter
3. Exporter monitors its own health
4. Proposed solution
Flow Collector
Analysis 
application
Flow Exporter NetFlow / IPFIX
Detections +
Control
Detections
Control
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(a) Exported flow packets
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(b) Unique IP addresses
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(c) Host activity
Fig. 2: Time series (10 sec) of the number of exported flow packets (Fig. (a)), the number of unique IP addresses (Fig. (b)), and attacker
activity (Fig. (c)).
number of flow records per flow packet is nearly consta t (99%
of all flow packets contain 27 or 28 flow records), Figure 2(a)
indeed provides an overview of the evolution of the attack
intensity in terms of network flows.
More than 20 000 unique IP addresses participated to the
attack, however with varying intensity. 127 attackers sent more
than 100 000 packets each, and 3185 attackers sent between
50 000 and 100 000 packets. There are strong indications that
the attack was coordinated: Most of the top 10 000 attackers
joine in exactly the same second and then stayed active for the
entire attack duration. Figure 2(b) shows the number of active
unique IP addresses per 10 seconds. When the attack begins,
we observe a sharp rise from a base line of around 10 unique
IPs to almost 70 000 and the number fluctuates from 70 000
to 60 000 during the duration of the attack. The figure also
shows sudden drops in the number of attacking hosts around
the second 37600. This is due to packet loss occurred when
the load on the collector was too high (see Section VI-A).
An additional proof that the attack has been coordinated is
given by Figure 2(c). The figure shows, on the x-axis, the
time in seconds during which an attacker has been active
(and contacted the target at least 50 times); on the y-axis,
the numb r of flow records generated by each attacker. We
can see that a large portion of the attackers has been active
for precisely 800 seconds, as indicated by the vertical line
at the right side of the figure. Moreover, it also becomes
evident that a second group of attackers has been active for
an interval of time varying from few seconds to 800 seconds,
but with a constant rate of flows per second (corresponding
to a rate of 100 SYN packets per second). In addition, a third
group of attackers have sent a relatively low number of SYN
packets per second, and they generate the uneven baseline in
the figure. The major characteristic of such hosts is that they
are clustered in groups of attackers sending the same number
of SYN packets. Finally, from the figure we can also infer
that several other hosts have contacted the target with varying
activity durations and intensity (the dots in the plot that do
not follow any of the three behaviors previously indicated).
C. Impact of the attack on the flow exporter
We now concentrate our attention to the impact of the
attack on the flow exporter. As described in Section IV-B,
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Fig. 3: Number of exported flow records per 10 seconds, for flow
records of the attacked host and of the other hosts.
a SYN flood attack will force the monitoring probe to deal
with an anomalous number of flow records. In order to better
understand how the attack affects the flow records, we have
split up them into two sets: (i) flow records of flows from/to
the attacked host and (ii) flow records of flows from/to the
other hosts. Figure 3 shows the resulting two timeseries of
the numbe of exported flow records per 10 seconds. Note the
different scales on the two y-axes. We can see that the attacked
host is not very active before the attack. In average, only 10
to 15 records per second contain the attacked host as source
or destination. As expected, the flow record export rate for the
attacked host sharply increases when the attack starts because
every SYN packet creates a new flow record.
However, we can also observe that the export rate for the
other hosts increases as well during the attack. This behavior
has been predicted in Section IV-B. As described there, if a
very large numb r of flows with unique flow keys is created, as
happens in the DDoS attack, the internal memory of the probe
is quickly exhausted and new flow records displace existing
records. This mechanism is also responsible for the extreme
peak in the export rate for the other hosts at the begin of
the attack (timestamp 37140): The new flow records for the
malicious traffic ”push” most of the existing flow records out
Currently, flow monitoring systems are subject to the negative effects of network anomalies. IDSs will 
therefore operate suboptimal due to both artifacts in the affected flow data and delays in the data 
collection process. We aim to make flow-based IDSs more resilient against anomalies and applicable to 
real-time data streams.
5. Conclusions
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